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New Hampshire:

The

Premarital
Testing Debacle

Susan D. Epstein

In 1987, the

New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services had a bill introduced in
and establish statewide public education on HIV

the legislature to improve contact tracing
infection, transmission,

rounding the
tion
Its

bill,

and disease

control. This article traces the bill,

and issues sur-

through the legislative process and focuses on an unexpected interven-

by the governor through a proposed amendment

conclusions offer advice to other states on

AIDS/HIV issues.
By the summer of 1987,

the AIDS issue in

to

add mandatory premarital testing.

how best to avoid political exploitation of

New Hampshire had become devoted to every-

revolved around presidential preferences a governor 's

show of
and legislative grandstanding. Substantive progress in curbing the further transmission of the virus through education, testing, and behavioral changes had been stymied.
How did this issue become so hotly politicized in New Hampshire ? Can our sister New
England states learn from our experience? Can the issue be better handled?
This article will trace a benign bill from its inception through its demise in the legislature. It will illustrate how the absence of apian and of consensus can leave this sensitive
thing but AIDS.

It

,

strength,

issue

open

to political exploitation.

Late in the summer of 1986, top staff in the Division of Public Health's Disease Control

Bureau met with the agency's deputy director to ask for any available money
AIDS. The Division's AIDS program was, and still is, financed entirely

to deal with

through federal funds granted for services to the high-risk population: male homosexuals,
hemophiliacs, intravenous drug users, and their partners. The number of seropositive

AIDS tests was beginning to climb steeply, and transmission had begun to move into the
general population. Like many other rural states, New Hampshire had had a slow start-up
on AIDS, but recent test results had indicated that the rate was escalating rapidly. The
Division was without resources
to deal
staff, supplies, equipment, expense money

—

with

—

this rise.

Susan D. Epstein, who holds a master ofpublic administration from the University of New Hampshire, served as
deputy director of the New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services from 1982 to 1987.
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To carry out

its

work with

had hired one health

the high-risk population, the Division

educator, one nurse, a part-time laboratory person, and a part-time secretary. Other Dis-

ease Control staff had been diverted to deal with the ever expanding cries for help with the
disease,
in

and

staff energies

1986 was projected

to

The Disease Control

were stretched dangerously

quadruple from 1985. 2

staff had other

thin.

The number of positive tests

No other resources could be redeployed.

concerns besides money. Through a network of

volunteers at five clinic sites and physicians around the state,

word had already come

back: instances of confidentiality breached, patients attempting suicide after receiving a
positive initial test result over the phone, hasty and illogical local policies

implemented to
from local and state prisons,
the state's reform school, its mental hospital, drug abuse units, private and public hospitals and specialty hospitals, police units, schools, insurance companies, and others for
help in developing policies and guidelines for staff, patients, customers, travelers, and
inmates. Nowhere in state law was the Division authorized to take these initiatives, and
deal with fear of AIDS.

The Division had received

nowhere had the legislature or the governor made
issues around AIDS.

The

entreaties

clear

whose job

it

was

to handle all the

Bill

Following consultation with the director and the commissioner of the Department of
Health and

Human Services,

a bill

was drafted

to outline the duties of the Division in

The governor's staff was notified that an AIDS bill would be
added to those bills coming from Public Health. A small AIDS task force, chaired by the
commissioner, received the preliminary draft. The chairpersons of both House and Senate
dealing with the disease.

Health Committees were notified, as was the state's health/medical community.
Public Health had only three weeks to prepare the
deadline.

The Division

felt that

bill for

submission for a September

the bill should address the duties assigned to Public

Health as well as issues relating to those duties, but not tackle those other areas which

have been affected by AIDS, such as housing, labor, employment, and

civil rights.

The

would address disease prevention and disease control issues for AIDS but would not discuss those at high risk and the specifics of transmission. In other words, sex, homosexuality, and drug use were not mentioned.
Division also determined that the

The bill
1

filed in the fall

had

six

bill

major components:

The Division of Public Health Services was authorized to develop AIDSeducation materials for schools, colleges, health care providers and
tutions, state agencies, business

2.

3.

The Division was to assist all
grams to deal with AIDS.

insti-

and industry, the media, and the public.

these groups in developing policies and pro-

The Division was to conduct laboratory testing for HIV infection already
was authorized to certify outside laboratories to conduct

in place, but

further testing and reporting.

4.

A highly specific informed-consent provision was included to combat the
increasingly prevalent practice of testing someone's blood for

out the person's knowledge, a practice leading to

476

some

HIV with-

tragic responses.

5.

A tight confidentiality plan was included to safeguard test results.
dentiality provisions

were backed up with penalties and

Confi-

liability provi-

sions.

6.

A total of $339,000 was requested for FY'88 and $325,000 for FY'89,
virtually doubling the size of the existing

program.

Strategy

The

strategy for the bill

was based on the assumption that it would take its hardest hits in
New Hampshire State Legislature's traditional reluctance to

the financial area, given the

fund new programs. Further, the Division assumed that the purpose of the
inoffensive that

With

little if

this logic, the

any restructuring would be done with

Senate's Health and Welfare Committee,

With support

add to more

new chairperson of the
and two members
Frank Torr and Sen. Ed Dupont, the

side, Elaine Krasker, the

who was

of the Senate's powerful Finance Committee, Sen.
leader.

was so

Human Services Committee; one member from

House Appropriations; and on the Senate

servative votes to

bill

substance.

Division requested sponsors from four key sources: several House

sponsors from the House Health and

new majority

its

to play a pivotal role,

in Appropriations,

and with the assurance of key con-

liberal votes in Senate Finance, the Division

hoped

to

pave

The legislative plan had been fashioned by Sen. Elaine Krasker, a seasoned representative and a former Democratic whip in the House, newly elected to the
Senate. Through her efforts, Representative Ramsay and Senators Torr and Dupont joined

a smooth passage.

the team.

Legislative Process

The bill was

well received at a large hearing before the

House Health and Human Services

Committee. Chairman Matthew Sochalski had placed some key committee members as
sponsors on the bill, in addition to the committee's six-term ranking Democrat, Rep.
Marion Copenhaver. A subcommittee headed by a retired pediatrician, Rep. Robert
Wilson, met to iron out some of the major issues raised in the committee hearing.
A major point of contention was the penalty provision, aimed at anyone who breached

HIV infection. For obvious reasons, repreNew Hampshire Medical Society and the New Hampshire Hospital Asso-

confidentiality concerning a patient tested for
sentatives of the

ciation

wanted the provision deleted. The subcommittee needed

that of the Coalition of Gay

legal protection, they

to

weigh

and Lesbian Rights (CAGLR), which argued

would refuse

to

be

tested.

their plea against

that without this

The recommended version was

a compro-

mise, maintaining the penalties but stipulating that a person must "purposely" violate
confidentiality in order to have

them

apply.

A section was added, requested by the correc-

tions commissioner, to permit testing without informed consent in prisons

and mental

institutions

when the testing would be necessary

the facility.

A troublesome section specifying at what age a minor's parents must be told

to place

and manage the individual within

of test results was deleted, permitting other statutes already on the books to apply. Having
still intact, the bill sailed through the House Health and Human ServCommittee and, some weeks later, through House Appropriations. The issue of
mandatory testing was not raised.

been amended but
ices

By the time of the appropriations hearing, concerns that the bill's budget would be
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who had raised concerns about substantive issues in the bill

diced up had vanished. Those

had

their

concerns dealt with by the compromises in committee. Appropriations was

bill back to the full House, where it passed on a voice vote.
Then the bomb dropped. The director of Public Health Services received a call on
Monday, April 6, from the governor's legal counsel, indicating that the governor was
going to hold a press conference on the AIDS bill on the following day and warning the

supportive and sent the

director not to "shoot [them] in the foot." There had been

no prior discussion with the

director of Public Health Services or with his boss, the commissioner of Health and

Hu-

man Services. There was no indication as to what the governor was planning to

and

no request

for opinion

from Public Health

say,

— not even an invitation to attend the press

conference. Several phone calls ascertained that neither the bill's sponsors nor the medi-

community had been consulted.
April 7, a staffer from the Division, armed with a tape recorder, went to
the governor's press conference to find out more. At the conference, the governor,
flanked by the Speaker of the House and the president of the Senate, Republicans all, said
he planned to introduce an amendment to the AIDS bill which would require AIDS testing
before couples would be permitted to marry. He indicated that the amendment would
cal

On Tuesday,

reinstate the old syphilis premarital testing requirement, since

precedent for requiring

it

could serve as a legal

HTV testing. He repeated several times that AIDS was a legal

issue, a political issue, a civil rights issue, but not a

medical issue. Finally, to the distress

of Public Health staff who had been struggling for three and a half years to quell the

spread of the disease, he noted that his measure was a

Of the many

start

and a small beginning. 3

questions from the press that followed, only one raised the prescient issue.

Veteran State House reporter

Donn Tibbetts,

of the Manchester Union Leader, asked,

with due respect to the state's three foremost political leaders, where were the medical

who supported or requested this measure. Governor Sununu simply repeated his
AIDS was not a medical issue. 4
If AIDS had not been a political issue before the governor's press conference, it became

people

claim that

one immediately afterward. Legislative sponsors, including Reps. Marion Copenhaver,
Trudy Butler, Larry Chase, and Robert Wilson, as well as Senator Krasker, were incensed.

The

state

medical society hastily called together the infectious disease physicians,

who prevailed upon the

society's Executive

Committee

to

oppose the measure. At Public

Health, which had been muzzled by orders not to shoot [the governor's office] in the foot,
press calls were passed to the governor's office, and the Division's role in working on

its

highest priority bill ended.

Press reaction to the proposed premarital testing plan included criticism from medical
specialists

and no comment from Public Health. 5 The governor then announced

that

he

came to his desk with his premarital amendment included. 6
Some local reporters picked up on Vice President George Bush's statement, made a day
after Sununu 's to USA Today, supporting premarital testing and remarked on the coinciwould veto the bill unless

it

dence, as Sununu serves as Bush's campaign chairman in
Criticism of the proposed
ing.

amendment by

the medical

Using data from Public Health's current

people

New Hampshire.

community was

7

swift and

damn-

testing, the critics pointed out that of 22,000

who would be required to be tested, only 2 would turn out to be truly positive. All
who tested positive — 218 — and their families and friends, would go

the other people

through hell in that interval between the
result. Critics

questioned

why

first positive test

to a long-term sexual relationship,

and the ultimately negative

monogamous couples already committed
should be compelled to be tested. The medical commu-

a low-risk group,
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nity voiced concerns about the

premise that premarital testing for syphilis would be rein-

The law mandating premarital

stated.

1981 there had not been a positive
;

The governor's

syphilis testing

test for

threat to veto the

by the

state

had been repealed

in

over five years. 8

AIDS bill if it arrived without his amendment drew

indictment from newspapers around the

state.

The Concord Monitor headlined

its

edi-

"Cross Power Play" and chastised the governor for "playing a deadly game of

torial

chicken with the Legislature." 9 Dr. Miles

McCue,

a

member of Governor Sununu's hand-

picked Task Force on AIDS, editorialized in the Boston Globe that the mandatory testing
proposal was "reckless with regard to

its

ignorance."

10

Even

the Manchester Union

Leader, the only statewide daily newspaper, generally supportive of Sununu, criticized

The press also reported, in a limited way, a "man
from
which
indicated a measure of public support for manthe
public
on
premarital
testing.
There
seemed
datory
to be low recognition of the distinction between
confidentiality
for
syphilis and AIDS. A breach of confidentiality
consequences of
leaks
the governor's "browbeating politics."

11

the street" sense

concerning

AIDS

causes

more than embarrassment. At the present time,

it

can threaten

the loss of one's housing, one's employment, life insurance, health insurance,
tially

as the bill

and poten-

—
—
would have provided
left the public unable to debate the merits of the very

one's medical and dental providers.

The absence of a public education program

issue that had been placed between the bill

and

its

passage.

The New Hampshire Medical Society's Infectious Disease section moved to convince
its Executive Committee to take action with the governor. The society directed its action
to

two

kill

fronts: first, to try to deal directly with

the

Governor Sununu, and, second,

amendment when it was introduced in the Senate.

to try to

A meeting between the governor

and a group representing the medical society proved inconclusive, and the society's
forts

were then directed toward the upcoming hearing

in the Senate

ef-

where the premarital

amendment was to be introduced.
In both the House and the Senate some of the debate over the premarital testing plan
began to center around which presidential aspirants supported it. Bush supporters, Kemp
and Dole supporters, lined up on the side of their candidate to show their relative strength.
Having dared the

legislature to defy him, the governor's supporters

publican and Democrat,
initiate

any action in the

fell in line.

first

and opponents, Re-

Having neglected to take any strong positions or

to

four months of the six-month legislative session, and having

placed himself firmly in a box on this issue, Governor Sununu had to rally the House and
Senate leadership to

The

first draft

hew to his position.

of the amendment was issued from the governor's legal counsel only

hours before the Senate hearing was to be held.

The draft amendment by

A copy had to be leaked to Public Health.

the governor's office would have gutted the

money needed

education and contact tracing by using most of it for premarital testing.

It

for

breached confi-

and eliminated pre- and post-test counseling. The process

for testing and testwas replete with dead ends. As the result of conversations between the
attorney general's office and the Speaker's office, the amendment had been completely
rewritten by April 28, the day of the Senate hearing. Provisions were added to allow the

dentiality

results reporting

testing to

be self-supporting, the syphilis provision was quietly deleted, and some of the

procedural issues were clarified.

The Senate hearing on April 28 was chaired by Sen. Elaine Krasker, the leading Senate
bill. Of the many speakers that morning who addressed the committee,

sponsor of the

only one urged the adoption of the governor's/Speaker's/Senate president's amendment:

an Ernest Schapiro, representing Lyndon LaRouche.
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One speaker after the

next urged the committee to pass the

bill as it arrived from the
amendment. The director of the New Hampshire
the state would be unable to prove it had a compelling

House and not

to include the governor's

Civil Liberties

Union argued

that

reason to require the invasive procedure of drawing blood, because the state could do
nothing with the results of that
conception. Dr. James

we need to reach

test;

it

couldn't offer a cure, stop the marriage, or prevent

Kahn of Deerfield warned the committee that "many of the people

are socially ostracized, medically indigent, and otherwise disconnected."

He pointed out that these are not the people who are already

accepting enough of society's
norms to be getting married.
At the close of the hearing, the committee unanimously passed the bill without the premarital amendment. The bill came to the full Senate for a vote on May 5, having been
through the Senate Finance Committee without a hearing, and it was there that the governor's staff went to work. They leaned on senators for hours, making promises and
threats, "bullying and bartering some members into changing their positions," according
n
On a roll call vote, the bill passed 13 to 11 with the premarital
to the Concord Monitor

provision attached.

Headed for Conference Committee to resolve the dispute (or kill the bill, as Conference
Committee must have unanimous votes and acceptance by both chambers), the pressure
increased with the approaching deadline in the Senate. The deadline for bills and committees of conference reports to be heard on the floor of the Senate was May 15. In order to
hear a bill or report after that date and vote on it, the House and Senate required a twothirds vote to suspend the rules.

The Senate vote on May

5 left ten calendar days to have conference committees ap-

pointed by both chambers, have the committees meet, deliberate, and concur, and have

both houses accept their version of the
porting on the issue, including the

bill.

New

By

this time, national

newspapers were

York Times and the Wall Street Journal. 13

re-

The

debate was being heard as well from the Cabinet in the White House, where Surgeon

General Koop and Education Secretary Bennett were evidently arguing over
ing and

AIDS

education.

AIDS

test-

14

At Public Health, an eerie kind of calm had settled in. The state budget bill was headed
Conference Committee; other Division bills were in their final stages of negotiation;
press teams roamed the halls; but Division staff had no comment and made only the most
necessary, and briefest, forays out.
Since the House had passed the bill without the premarital amendment and the Senate
had passed the bill with the amendment, the House Speaker and Senate president apinto

pointed a Conference Committee. Despite their position in support of premarital testing,

both leaders appointed members on both sides of the issue.

The group met in the basement of the
Krasker.

State

House, in the cramped offices of Senator

A fire in the Legislative Office Building days earlier had left many legislators

"homeless" and had destroyed a great many files. The Conference Committee, after
some rousting about, voted to include a sanitized version of the premarital testing plan.
They added funds to conduct the testing so as not to have the costs of the testing be taken
from the main AIDS bill. They also worked out a timing mechanism for reporting to town
clerks that a couple had taken the test such that the

town clerk would not be able

to

deduce

who had had a positive test. Both Senator Krasker and Representative Copenhaver made it
clear they didn't much like having to include even a sanitized premarital provision, but
they were concerned that the

bill

would not

prevail without

480

it.

On May

13, just

two days before the Senate deadline, the Senate approved the Confer-

ence Committee's report on a voice vote. The Conference Committee report then had to

be adopted by the House.
That day, Representative Copenhaver called the other sponsors, and Public Health, to
say she just could not sign the report. She indicated that she would fight against the Con15
ference Committee report on the floor.

She then went to the members of the House one by one and explained why it would be
wrong to include the premarital provision. She argued the impropriety of the governor's
having introduced an amendment after the bill had already been passed by the House; she
talked about the anguish of those testing positive

who eventually are found to be negative,

and graphically depicted the plight of couples and families with their weddings on hold
and their reputations ruined. She dared the House members to stand up for what she knew

from the governor and the wishes of their own
House sponsors worked the floor with her, letting members know that they
had not been consulted, that the testing was expensive and would yield few positives, that
even the U.S. Surgeon General had written to say that mandatory premarital testing was a
be

to

right, in spite of possible retribution

Speaker. Other

poor solution.

The House,

in

an emotional session, rallied to Representative Copenhaver' s

call

and

rejected the Senate's version, with a roll call vote of 136 yeas to 165 nays. Then, in a

of strength, the House voted 157 to 138 to convene a
instructions that they consider the bill only
is,

show

new Conference Committee, with

on the basis of the House-passed version,

that

without the premarital provision. The Speaker replaced Marion Copenhaver on the

new Conference Committee,

but included

members who had

strongly and eloquently

supported the House position. This gesture of support for the House's position, although

own

him respect from his colleagues, as he had
promised to listen to the House's voice when elected Speaker.
A first moral crusade had been fought and won. A second Committee of Conference
on the AIDS bill was to then convene in some haste. The May 15 deadline for bills and
reports on the Senate floor had passed; therefore, a two-thirds majority vote would be
required to suspend the rules and allow a bill to be voted on. The House had locked itself
into a tight position, making negotiation difficult. Sen. Edward Dupont, the new Senate
majority leader, was a conferee, and he represented the Senate president. A small room
it

was

antithetical to his

stance, earned

had been located on the first floor of the State House. It was packed and hot, and press
were in attendance. A unanimous vote was needed or the bill would die.
Senator Dupont opened by roundly criticizing the House for sending in conferees
whose hands were tied. He talked about how committed he was to the premarital testing,
indicating that, as an original sponsor of the bill, had he known then what he knew now,
the bill would have been introduced with the provision included. He voiced the plea that
had been used over and over by the Speaker and Senate president, that "if only one baby is
saved by this," then the amendment is worth it. He said he would compromise by allowing
anyone who was phobic about needles to be excused from the test by an order of the court.
The House members indicated that this really did not represent much of a compromise.
Representative Kerk, a new conferee and House member, proposed an alternative that
had been discussed earlier with some of the medical society physicians. Why not, he sug-

mandatory premarital questionnaire, and allow people to elect to take the
answered yes to some of the questions. Senator Dupont went off to seek guidance on this idea, and returned later to say that it was unacceptable.
gested, have a

test if they
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An emotional burst from Rep.
demand

shouted, did they

—

addicts and homosexuals and

"Ednapearl, they are

Ednapearl Parr brought the issue to a head. Why, she

to test

"innocent people"

when they should be testing drug

In a level voice, Senator Krasker silenced her by saying,

all innocent.

There are no guilty people

in this."

Dupont explained that this was exactly why the premarital group would be so useful. It was precisely their "innocence" that meant their
subjection to mandatory testing would open the way for mandatory testing of "other
In the quiet that followed, Senator

groups."

He did not elaborate.

and announced
tal

that

After another break to receive instructions, he returned

he would sign the Conference Committee report without the premari-

provision included. But, he added, he would fight

the necessary two-thirds vote.

He concluded,

its

entry onto the floor, and block

"I have the votes."

This, then, was the plan. If Dupont could indeed block the bill's entry onto the floor,
the bill

in Conference Committee. No senator would actually have
AIDS bill, and the governor would not have to fulfill his threat of a veto.

would technically die

to vote against the

last plea, Dupont had revealed the purpose of the governor's amendwas clear now why the amendment had been proposed, why the governor had
called it "a start, a small beginning," and why he had repeated that this was a legal issue, a
civil rights issue, a political issue, but not a medical issue. For indeed, if you can mandate

However, in his

ment.

It

when the results

testing of a low-risk group, even

for

any purpose, then

that those in

it is

a

first step to

of that test cannot be used by the state

begin testing of any group, especially any group

power find unacceptable. Using AIDS as a mechanism to

civil rights is certainly a legal issue

and a political

issue, not a

curtail a group's

medical issue. But

exactly this use of medicine to achieve results that have nothing to

do with health

it is

that is

most distressing.

On May

19, Senator

be heard on the floor

Krasker 's motion to suspend the rules and allow the

failed in a

12-12 Senate vote, and the

AIDS bill to

bill died.

Conclusion

HIV testing is an issue ripe for distortion and political manipulation. Because so much is
not known, and since much that is known has not been clearly enunciated, there is widespread public

fear.

To

this is

added a growing

distrust of the health care

community's

truthfulness in assessing the real risks of AIDS. Suspicion that medicine

cannot be transmitted through casual

is

deliberately

wrong in its assessment that HIV infection
contact makes public education a particularly diffi-

understating the risks of transmission and

is

cult endeavor.

In

New Hampshire's experience last year,

tion of the public

ation of the

too

little

AIDS

and elected
issue.

officials to

For our

sister

the

problem stemmed from too

little

educa-

permit genuine debate and unbiased consider-

New England states,

information, but too much. There are

many

the issue by

now may be not

voices talking, authoritatively, about

AIDS testing, and the public and media have little to help them

sift

through the morass of

The New Hampshire experience had three bad longscarred relationships between decision makers, making

speculation, hyperbole, and fact.

term consequences:

(1)

it

left

future planning difficult; (2)

wary public; and

(3)

it

further confused, and therefore frightened, an already

by killing the

bill, it

delayed care, counseling, and public education

for at least one year — one year longer for the disease to spread among a poorly informed

public.
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To avoid

New Hampshire's debacle,

whose "voice"

is

our

sister states

need

to build a central coalition

reasoned and whose membership represents a broad spectrum of re-

spected medical and community organizations. Without such a coalition, politicians and

some media
that

it is

will exploit conflicting opinions

and further erode the public's confidence

receiving honest information. In concert with governors, a central coalition

should establish a plan that considers
tion with respect to states

and

all

the

many

doors be opened to introduce legislation.

fold.

With

HIV

infec-

Then, and only then, should the

A well-informed coalition and a well-informed

governor can prevail upon legislators to withhold

brought into the

ramifications of AIDS and

lays out concrete actions.

bills until

legislative, gubernatorial,

they have been educated and

and coalition support,

bills

have not

only a better chance of passage, but also a better chance of producing useful information
for press

and public

to consider.

Harassment and discrimination have no place

sideration of disease-control measures.

We

can and must do

better.

in the con-

M^
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